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We welcome the opportunity to respond to the commentaries on our paper-The
Mouse that Trolled-by Hardy', Sarnoff 2 , and Cordova and Feldman 3 . Their comments are academic criticism in the very best sense. We also take the opportunity to update on recent legal actions, which we had not predicted. This opportunity enriches our
narrative history of the patenting of the APPswe mutation for early onset Alzheimer's
disease, and we hope the continued saga is of interest.
HARDY'S POLICY CHANGE

We find it heartening that Prof. Hardy concurs with our main points and learned from
his experience in deciding years later not to patent mutations on another Alzheimer'srelated gene, TREM2. His point that the financial benefits redound to the discoverers
and inventors, but not to the donor families of the DNA that enabled those discoveries, is very well taken. It is not necessarily a flaw in the patent system, which is designed to reward only some of the steps involved in socially beneficial innovation, but
it points to an asymmetry and injustice of the innovation system as a whole in the way
the fruits of innovation are distributed. Those who contribute tissue and information
are treated as altruistic 'donors' eligible only for non-financial rewards. Those intangible
benefits can be substantial if someone contributes to a scientific advance or technological breakthrough in the form of novel diagnostics or therapies, but the system does not
1
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John Hardy, The Mouse that Trolled,. J. L. & Biosci. (2016), http://jlb.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/
2015/09/01/jlb.lsv035.full.
Joshua D. Sarnoff, The PatentLaw Duchy of GrandFenwick: A Comment On The Mouse That Trolled: The Long
And Tortuous History Of A Gene MutationPatent that Became An Expensive Impediment to Alzheimer's Research.
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provide 'donors' with any of the financial benefits. Yet the same system of innovation
treats those who do research and development and those who put products and services
on the market as motivated primarily by financial reward. Each of these frameworksan idealistic Mertonian science with only intangible rewards,4 and a Kitchean prospect
theory of financially driven patent incentives 5-leaves out important elements in how
innovation actually works. For many scientists, including by his comment John Hardy,
the advance of science and medicine are strong incentives, often far stronger than the
financial ones. Indeed, one lesson from this tale is that the pure science and pure capitalism frameworks are each, taken on their own, inadequate to explain how to optimally
motivate the various players in innovation.
ANOTHER MOUSE TROLLS

We corroborate that Prof Hardylearned about our paper only after it was published. He
then initiated correspondence with us that has given us valuable insight. His perspective
as a scientist on events and policies is a welcome addition. Despite not seeking patents
on TREM2, he has not, as it turns out, escaped the patent battles over Alzheimer'srelated genes.
After Hardy's note appeared in the Journal, in December 2015, the University of
South Florida (USF) filed two additional lawsuits asserting a patent that Prof Hardy
and his collaborator Karen Duff assigned to USF when they were on faculty there (US
Patent 5898,094). The Duff-Hardy patent claims transgenic mice that have the APPswe mutation along with another mutation in PSEN1 that is also associated with familial
Alzheimer's disease. Prof Hardy now works at University College London's Institute
of Neurology, London. Prof Duff now works at Columbia University's Medical Center. Prof Hardy learned of these recent suits through us, not through USF, the plaintiff
enforcing his patent.
One suit was filed against the US Government in the US Court of Federal Claims
on December 18, 2015 (case 15-1549C). It seeks recompense for the distribution of
transgenic mice under NIH grants and cooperative agreements, as discussed in our article. US law gives the federal government the right to use patented inventions for government purposes, but also obligates the government to give fair recompense to patent
holders (28 USC @1498). As the suit alleged, the NIH signed a 2011 'authorization and
consent' agreement with Jackson Laboratories (JAX) with funding to distribute transgenic mice ofmany kinds, including those with mutations in Alzheimer's-related genes.
While Alzheimer's mice constitute a small fraction of the strains available throughJAX,
but are an important research priority. USF is seeking compensation for the transgenic
mice claimed in the Duff-Hardy patent that have been distributed under the federal
grants and cooperative agreements. The USF complaint lists nine mouse strains that
include a PSEN1 mutation, and that it claims infringe the asserted patent. Those mouse
strains were donated by researchers at the University of California at Irvine, Stanford

4
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Robert K. Merton, Science and Technology in a Democratic Order, 115 1 J. LEGAL POL. SOCIoL. 126 (1942);
reprinted as SCIENCE AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL STRUCTURE' IN MERTON'S SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1949, 1957, and 1968), and finally reprinted as THE NORMATIVE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS (University of Chicago Press) (1979).
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20J. L. & ECON. 265, 290 (1977).
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University, University of Florida, and Northwestern University and are distributed by

JAX.
So far as we can determine from searches of databases on US federal grants, and
corroborated by Prof. Hardy, federal funds were not used in the research that gave rise
to the Duff-Hardypatent, so it is not subject to the government use rights of the BayhDole Act (35 USC @18).
The second lawsuit was filed against JAX on December 22, 2015 in the US District
Court for the Middle District ofFlorida (8:15-cv-02916-MSS-EAJ). It alleges patent infringement. It seeks treble damages for willful infringement and requests an injunction
against JAX from distributing transgenic mice claimed in the patent.
The parallels with the story of our article are striking, but there are important differences. First, in our story, the purported inventor ofthe patents on the APPswe mutations
was Michael Mullan. One of our points was that the US Patent and Trademark Office
granted claims to transgenic mice incorporating the mutation based on sequence ofthe
mutation alone, whereas it actually took manyyears to develop a mouse model. Mullan
himselfnever did so; others took the baton and advanced the science to produce mouse
models of Alzheimer's disease. In contrast to Mullan, Duff and Hardy became leaders
in Alzheimer's mouse transgenics, and we cited their 1995 Nature paper in our article.
We argued that the Mullan patents might well be deemed invalid if challenged for failing to meet the enablement or written description requirements for patentability (35
USC 112). Those arguments would not apply with the same force to the Duff-Hardy
patent in the USF suits.
Another important difference is that the Duff-Hardy patent was assigned to USF.
This comports with Florida state law obligating state employees to report inventions
and assign patent rights to their state university employers. That did not happen with
the Mullan patents. A jury decided that Mullan did not have rights to assign because
he excluded Hardy as a legally necessary coinventor, and even if he had such rights, he
was subject to Florida state law, under which the patent should have been managed by
the University, not licensed to the Alzheimer's Institute ofAmerica without the University's knowledge. These are important differences that distinguish the Mullan patents
at the center of our article from the USF suits.
ACADEMIC TROLLING

The more important point about the USF suits is that a university is suing the government and a non-profit research institution for distributing research tools. Many academic research institutions produce patented and unpatented research tools in the process of doing science. Indeed, our forthcoming patent landscape of the mouse research
tools identified 7179 granted US patents up to 2007, most of which were maintained
over their lifetime, and most of which were held by academic research institutions. 6
Patent claims included mouse genes and their human orthologs, transgenic mouse
strains, derivative cell lines, and associated methods. If USF succeeds in its suits, will
it induce similar actions by other academic institutions? We have no idea whether this

6

Tania Bubela et al., Governance of Biomedical Research Commons to Advance ClinicalTranslation:Lessons from
the Mouse Model Community, in GOVERNING MEDICAL RESEARCH COMMONS (K. Strandburg, M. Madison & B.
Frischmann eds., Cambridge University Press (2016) (in press).
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will become commonplace, but to date it has not been standard conduct ofuniversities,
and it could set a fateful precedent.
Cordova and Feldman focus their commentary on the possible threat of patent
trolling by non-practicing entities, noting 'numerous patents that could be deployed
with the same techniques that patent trolls have used in the technology sector' and issue a warning: 'it is clear, however, that there will be similar examples [to the case we
described] in the future'. That warning has already been borne out by the USF suitsbut with a twist. USF did not license its patents to a non-practicing entity to litigate on
its behalf, but has itself filed the lawsuits in question. USF cut out the middle man. We
concur with Cordova and Feldman that these cases should 'make us think deeply about
the role that the public expects universities to play in society'.
These cases will be worth following closely, since their success could require considerable restructuring of academic research practices. By asking for an injunction, USF
urges the court to shut down JAX distribution of the nine strains absent a licensing
arrangement with USF. The USF complaint is silent on whether there is any other
source for the transgenic mice. USF is not suing a competitor, but the world's main
non-profit source of a research tool used to study and develop possible treatments for
Alzheimer's disease. Whether this is a bargaining tactic or an incompletely thoughtthrough strategy-seeking a standard remedy from traditional patent infringement litigation to a situation in which the defendant is not a competitor, where an injunction
would make Alzheimer's research tools unavailable-may come to light as the case
progresses. The cases are being brought by Jerry Stouck, who 'specializes in litigation
against federal government agencies on behalf of contractors'. 7
If USF were to prevail, and especially if other research institutions were to follow
USF's lead in seeking revenues for distribution of patented research tools from other
non-profit and government institutions, then repositories such as JAX would need to
become clearinghouses for patent rights as well as research tools, and would have to
track uses to allocate royalties-raising transaction costs.JAX and most other repositories have deliberately eschewed the role of royalty collector and allocator. JAX requires
depositors to agree, whether they hold patents or not, that their mouse lines will be distributed using Simplified Conditions ofUse to non-profit researchers.8 Depositors may
decide to distribute to industry users. If depositors allow distribution to industry, JAX
merely acts as a broker, distributing the line once it receives evidence of an agreement
between the depositor and the industry user. This suit challenges the JAX distribution
model.
HOW DOES PATENT EXCLUSIVITY MAP TO RESEARCH?

The two new USF suits also bear directly on points raised by Sarnoff about the need
to restore a domain of scientific activity free from infringement liability. He notes that
the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit made clear in Madey v. Duke University (307 F.3d 1343-1349, 2002) that research, including research at non-profit academic institutions, is subject to infringement liability for 'making and using', even if not
7

Jerry Stouck, Right and Wrong Ways to Use Others' Patents, NATIONAL DEFENSE BLOG, 2008, http://www.
nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2008/June/Pages/Ethics2293.aspx

8

(accessed Jan. 9, 2016).

David Einhorn & Rita Heimes, Creating a Mouse Academic Research Commons, 27 (10) NAT. BIOTECHNOL. 890,

891 (2009).
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'selling', a patented invention. Our colleagues Wesley Cohen, Ashish Arora, Charlene
Cho, and John Walsh note that, in practice, most academic researchers pay little attention to patent rights in their research, with a few exceptions, and that patent rights
generally do not impede research. 9 More suits like the USF suits against the US Government and JAX could change that.
One solution is to restore the traditional 'research exemption' from infringement liability. The European and Australian law enables research on an invention to see how it
works, but Sarnoff urges a broader conception: 'Patents simply did not and should not
extend to scientific research'. This would apply even to commercially driven research
so long as it does not 'actually compete in the marketplace for use of the patented invention nor commercially benefit in its own production operations from using the invention'.

The US research exemption was created in common law, not by statute, starting with
JusticeJoseph Story's dicta in cases before the Massachusetts Circuit Court at the time
of Napoleon (1813). In Europe and Australia such research use is codified. Sarnoffs
comment rekindles a long-standing debate about having a research exemption similarly codified in US law. The issue is, however, a lack of consensus about how to set
its boundaries. Too broad an exemption undermines patent incentives for research
tools that are most efficiently developed as commercial products and services. Some
storied patents in biotechnology were on platform technologies. Think recombinant
DNA ($255 million revenues for University of California and Stanford),1 0 Columbia's
cotransformation patents ($790 million),' 1 polymerase chain reaction ($300 million
for Cetus and $2 billion for Roche),1 2 and now patent battles over CRISPR and families of DNA-cutting enzymes.13 A too-narrow exemption fails to serve its intended
purpose of freeing research from infringement liability. Lack of a statutory research exemption in US law is not entirely from want of trying. A 1990 House bill, HR 1015598, proposed a research exemption; early 2007 drafts of what became the America
Invents Act of 2011 also proposed to exempt some research uses from infringement
liability.

9

John P. Walsh, Wesley M. Cohen & Charlene Cho, Where Excludability Matters: Material versus intellectual
property in academic biomedicalresearch, 36 RES. PoL'Y 36 (8): 1184, 1203 (2007); John P.Walsh, Ashish Arora
& Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing ofBiomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 340 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds, National Academies

Press) (2003).
10 Niels Reimers, Tiger by the Tail, 17 CHEMTECH. 464-71(1987), reprinted in 7J.AsS'N .UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS

25,47; M.P. Feldman, A. Colaianni & C.K. Liu, Lessons from the Commercializationof the Cohen-BoyerPatents:
The Stanford University Licensing Program,in 22 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES (Anatole Krattinger ed., Oxford) (2007); Sally S.
Hughes, Making Dollars Out of DNA, 92 Isis 541, 575 (2001).
" Alessandra Colaianni & Robert Cook-Deegan, Columbia University's Axel Patents: Technology Transfer and
Implicationsfor the Bayh-DoleAct, 87(3) THE MILBANK Q 683, 715 (2009).
12 Joe Fore, Use R. Wiechers & Robert Cook-Deegan, The Effects of Business Practices, Licensing and Intellectual
Property on the Development and Dissemination of the Polymerase Chain Reaction: A Case Study, 3 J. BIoMED.
DisC. & COLLABORATION 1, 7 (2006).
13 Jacob S. Sherkow, The CRISPR Patent Interference Showdown Is On: How Did We Get Here and
What Comes Next?, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL LAW AND BIOSCIENCES BLOG (2015), https://law.
stanford.edu/2015/12/29/the-crispr-patent-interference-showdown-is-on-how-did-we-get-here-and-whatcomes-next/ (accessed Jan. 9, 2016).
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Sarnoff's suggestion builds on articles in legal journals: a seminal 1989 article by Rebecca Eisenberg,' 4 and an article by Suzanne Michel in 1992 specifically addressed the
exemption's applicability to federally funded inventions;is as did a series of articles by
Rochelle Dreyfus, Donna Gitter, Janice Mueller, and Maureen O'Rourke just before
and after the Madey decision.' 6 Perhaps, at some point, a window of opportunity will
open for congressional action.
The alternative to statutory change is case law. However, given the considerable turmoil and uncertainty about how to interpret jurisprudence over patentable subject matter (35 USC 101)-Bilski v Kappos,Mayov Prometheus,Assoc. Molec. Pathol. vMyriad,
and Alice v CLS Bank-and the tug-of-war between the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, seeking certainty from case law may be a vain hope.
COSTS OF LITIGATION

Sarnoff also wishes we had included more information about 'the actual costs imposed
and the research that was foregone because of the patent threats'. We dearly wish we
could comply more fully. Assessing what research has not taken place entails dubious counterfactual speculation, although we did gather ample evidence that the field
of Alzheimer's genetics was rife with conflict and fear of litigation. Our efforts to contact Swedish researchers, for example, led to a response from a lawyer who explicitly
noted that his client feared litigation. Our interviews were covered by a Certificate of
Confidentiality from the NIH, and several interviews were emphatically off the record.
Moreover, given the litigious climate, we would not have trusted answers to questions
about what research someone wanted to conduct but did not, given the strong incentives to either exaggerate or underplay the damage in an adversarial ethos.
The surveys fielded by Walsh and Cohen do ask questions about projects not pursued, although for a much broader range of science and scientists. That survey methodology, however, fits poorly with a case study such as ours. We nonetheless agree with
Sarnoff's desire for more reliable and methodologically rigorous empirical data about
real costs of patent policies.
One aspect of costs has, however, been illuminated by Alzheimer's Institute of America (AIA) vAvid Pharmaceuticals:the costs of defending against litigation. In our article,
we bemoaned the lack of access to litigation costs, since many of the relevant records
were sealed. There is now a public record of some costs. When Judge Savage ruled the
case was 'exceptional' and directed that AIA payAvid's legal costs, the court appointed
a special master to assess those costs. Gene D. Cohen, the Special Master, mediated a
request for fees from Avid's legal team and AIA's challenge to those fees. He reviewed
only this one case, not the dozen others that preceded it, so it is a substantial underestimate of the overall litigation costs recounted in our article. And the costs are only those
14 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHL L.
REv. 1017, 1086 (1989).
1 Suzanne T. Michel, The Experiemental Use Exception to Infringement Applied to
Federally FundedInventions,
7 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 369,410 (1992).
16 Donna M. Gitter, InternationalConflicts over PatentingHuman DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: an Argumentfor Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-UseExemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1623, 1637
(2001); Janice M. Mueller, No 'DilettanteAffair': Rethinking the ExperimentalUse Exception to PatentInfringementfor Biomedical Research Tools, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 17 (2001); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine
of FairUse in PatentLaw, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1177,1205 (2000).
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of the defendant, not those of the plaintiff. They are nonetheless illustrative. Avid's legal
team requested $6,867,219.31; the Special Master reduced this by $2923,901.61 and
recommended that AIA pay $3,943,317.70 to Avid.' 7 The story is not over, as Avid has
filed objections to some of the reductions and takes particular umbrage at bearing full
costs of the Special Master's services, with a five-page account of the protracted and
apparently unpleasant mediation process for deciding the fees.18
THE BOTTOM LINE

The patent battles are a side-show in research on Alzheimer's disease, which is a major
biomedical research priority. The tale ofthe Mullan patents was an unusual case of trolls
who fished with an invalid patent for inventions that they never made under patent
ownership that was tainted by shenanigans. The new cases are still about trolling, with
a state university suing government and a non-profit research institution for revenues
from distributed research tools. A recent article by authors from JAX emphasizes the
central importance of mouse models in understanding Alzheimer's disease.1 9 We end
by echoing Duff and Hardy's final sentence about what's truly important: 'expanding
and distributing colonies of mice should be a priority'.20
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